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In the evolving debate and analysis of global imbalances, a commonly overlooked issue pertains to
rising protectionism. This paper attempts to fill that gap, examining the macroeconomic implications
of trade policy changes through the lens of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy
encompassing four regional blocs. Simulation exercises are carried out to consider the imposition of
uniform and discriminatory tariffs on trading partners as well as the case of tariff retaliation. We also
discuss a scenario in which a 'globalization backlash' lowers the degree of competition in import-competing
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paolo.pesenti@ny.frb.org￿Should globalization be allowed to proceed and thereby create an ever more
￿exible international ￿nancial system, history suggests that current imbalances
will be defused with little disruption.... I say this with one major caveat. Some
clouds of emerging protectionism have become increasingly visible on today￿ s hori-
zon...The costs of any new such protectionist initiatives, in the context of wide
current account imbalances, could signi￿cantly erode the ￿exibility of the global
economy.￿ ￿ Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.1
1 Introduction
Unprecedented global imbalances have stirred an ongoing and lively policy debate. Can
they be sustained, and for how long? If not, can an orderly rebalancing be achieved with-
out severely disrupting international trade and ￿nance or global growth? Past episodes tell
a cautionary tale regarding the implications of very large de￿cits (and their reversals).2
Guided by lessons of history, mainstream views worry about the ￿ inevitable￿external ad-
justment and the prospect of large swings in the value of the dollar.3 Others believe that
concerns are overblown and question the instructiveness of past experiences, noting that
an expanding universe of current accounts, declining correlations between saving and in-
vestment, and accumulating gross (as well as net) foreign asset positions4 signify a rapidly
shifting global landscape.5
But attention and concern attached to external balances have, in fact, increased not
decreased in recent years. In particular, persistent and widening trade and payments im-
balances have fuelled rising protection sentiment and posturing in a number of countries.
In the United States, for example, several congressional bills concerning trade imbalances
have been written.6 At the heart of the controversy are sizable trade surpluses in emerging
Asia, paired with substantial foreign reserve accumulation and large-scale intervention in
the currency market to limit exchange rate ￿ exibility. In fact, roughly three-quarters of the
vast global reserve build-up between 1999 and 2004 is attributable to Asia. During that
time, key Asian central banks ￿ including India, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and Malaysia ￿ as a group have more than doubled their o¢ cial holdings of foreign
securities, mostly U.S. Treasuries, to over $2 1/2 trillion. Japan and China account for the
bulk of these holdings, although oil exporting countries have more recently played a larger
role in foreign reserve accumulation.7
Central to their ￿ new Bretton Woods￿hypothesis, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Gar-
1Greenspan (2003).
2See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), Edwards (2004) and Freund (2005).
3See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000, 2006), International Monetary Fund (2002).
4See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003, 2004), Tille (2003), Faruqee and Lee (2006). See also Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2005a).
5Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006) argue that the U.S. is e⁄ectively neither a de￿cit nor a debtor
country once the value of foreign assets is appropriately assessed (i.e., taking the so-called ￿ dark matter￿into
account). Buiter (2006) criticizes this logic. Gourinchas and Rey (2006) suggest that the current account
itself is becoming a less relevant concept, given ever-increasing valuation e⁄ects, which can facilitate external
adjustment.
6For a survey of U.S. congressional trade bills related to China see Hufbauer and Wong (2004).
7See Garton (2004), Higgins and Klitgaard (2004).
1ber (2004, 2006) emphasize how these policy actions are deliberately related to export-led
growth and development strategies ￿ strategies that could remain in place for a very long
time.8 Undervaluation of Asian currencies ￿ which Goldstein (2004) estimates to be 15 to
25 percent in the case of China ￿ obviously does not help to unravel rising trade frictions.
And beyond exchange rate policies, another contentious issue is implicit export subsidies,
including inter-alia tax advantages and other government preferences, state-owned enter-
prises, and export ￿ zones￿ ,9 whose trade implications are often not dissimilar to those of an
undervalued currency.10
But ￿ scapegoating￿often emanates from domestic economic woes, and the recent situation
may not be an exception. In the recent past job growth in the United States has been below
previous economic recoveries, particularly in sectors exposed to foreign competition. Wages
have also reacted slowly to changing business conditions. Not surprisingly, politicians and
business leaders alike are tempted to support protectionism as an appealing and politically
costless recipe to address internal and external problems.
What seems to be missing ￿ or severely overlooked ￿ in this debate is the quantitative
assessment of the implications for the world economy of a potential resurgence in protection-
ism. Questions such as the one in the title of this paper cannot be satisfactorily addressed
without a coherent analytical framework to guide scenario analysis and simulation exercises.
This paper is a preliminary step in this direction.
First, we set up and calibrate a general-equilibrium, dynamic model of the world economy
encompassing four regional blocs, one of which is emerging Asia. The model represents ￿ we
believe ￿ a fair compromise between the two extreme poles of realism and complexity versus
stylization and tractability.11 While its scale is larger and its structure more detailed than
most academic dynamic general-equilibrium models, our model shares with the relevant
literature the adoption of solid choice-theoretic foundations, and closely builds on recent
theoretical developments in international macroeconomics.
The model converges to a well-de￿ned non-stochastic steady-state, where all relevant
macroeconomic variables are determined as functions of structural parameters and policy
variables. We carry out comparative statics exercises by comparing the steady-state prop-
erties of the model before and after the imposition of import tari⁄s. We consider the e⁄ects
of protectionist policies undertaken by each importing country both when tari⁄s are im-
posed on imports from the rest of the world as a whole and when they discriminate across
exporters.
Next, we construct a ￿ baseline￿scenario as follows. We take a speci￿c point in time
(namely, 2006Q1) at which the economy is assumed not to be in a steady state due to the
occurrence of several country-speci￿c macroeconomic shocks sometime in the past. The
shocks have di⁄erent sizes and di⁄erent degrees of persistence. Judgemental assumptions
about these shocks are made to guarantee that, at the beginning of the simulation horizon,
the model generates values for the relevant endogenous variables which are broadly consistent
with the observed levels at the end of 2005. The propagation mechanism intrinsic to the
8See Eichengreen (2004), Roubini and Setser (2005) for a critique.
9See, for example, Hufbauer and Wong (2004) and Morrison (2005).
10Morgan Stanley, for example, estimates that removing China￿ s explicit and implicit export subsidies
would be equivalent to a 16 percent appreciation of the currency against the dollar (quoted in Laura D￿ Andrea
Tyson, ￿Stop Scapegoating China ￿Before It￿ s Too Late￿, Business Week, May 2, 2005).
11The model is a variant of the Global Economy Model (GEM) developed at the International Monetary
Fund.
2model generates dynamic paths for all endogenous variables converging to the new steady-
state world equilibrium levels. We refer to these paths as the baseline scenario in our
analysis. While it is not meant to provide a macroeconomic forecast for the world economy,
our baseline provides plausible quantitative elements to asses the extent of price and quantity
adjustment associated with global rebalancing.
Finally, we reconsider the above scenario modi￿ed to account for the unanticipated
imposition of import tari⁄s at the beginning of the simulation horizon, and study how the
new scenario deviates from the previous baseline. According to our estimates, a generalized
10 percent hike against emerging Asia improves the US current account balance as a share
of GDP by a mere 0.1 percentage point. The e⁄ect disappears after about two years, and
in the absence of further adjustment in net saving, it may even revert sign. Similar e⁄ects
hold in the rest of the world. All in all, our analysis strongly suggests that the answer to
the question in the title of this paper is a resounding no.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y provides a non-technical overview
of the model and discusses the calibration. The baseline scenario is introduced in Section 3.
Section 4 considers the e⁄ects of tari⁄ hikes, both uniform and selective, and discusses the
case in which protectionist pressures take the form of a backlash against competition-friendly
reforms in import-competing sectors. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of the global economy
2.1 The theoretical structure
The simulation model we adopt in this paper builds upon Faruqee, Laxton, Muir and Pesenti
(hereinafter FLMP) (2006), appropriately modi￿ed. In this section we limit ourselves to a
very synthetic overview of the theoretical framework, highlighting a few formal features of
particular relevance for the simulation exercises.12
The world economy consists of four regional blocs (￿ countries￿ ): US (United States),13
JE (Japan and euro area), AS (Emerging Asia), and RC (Remaining Countries). In each
country, there are households, ￿rms, and a government. The overall structure of the model
is illustrated in Figure 1, and each sector is described in turn below.
Each household consumes a non-tradable ￿nal good (C in Figure 1), and is the monop-
olistic supplier of a di⁄erentiated labor input (‘) to all domestic ￿rms. Some households
are liquidity-constrained and do not have access to capital markets. They ￿nance their
consumption exclusively through disposable labor incomes. The remaining households own
domestic ￿rms and the domestic capital stock (K), which they rent to domestic ￿rms. They
also own two short-term nominal bonds, one denominated in domestic currency and issued
by the country￿ s government, and another denominated in US currency and issued in zero
net supply worldwide. There are intermediation costs for national households transacting
in the international bond market.14 Labor and capital are immobile internationally. The
12Technical details are extensively discussed in the Appendix to the working paper version of this article.
13To avoid confusion, in the text we refer to ￿US￿ as the region of the model, and to the ￿U.S.￿ as the
real-world United States.
14Like most open-economy general-equilibrium models, the assumption that all current-account transac-
tions are settled in terms of a unique international bond is made for parsimony reasons. We leave to future
developments the extension of the model toward a more realistic ￿nancial market structure which includes
trade in equities as well.
3market for capital is competitive, and capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs.
In the labor market wage contracts are subject to nominal rigidities.
On the production side, perfectly competitive ￿rms produce two ￿nal goods ￿ a con-
sumption good (A) and an investment good (E). The consumption good is consumed either
by domestic households or by the government (GC). Similarly, demand for the investment
good is split between private agents (I) and the public sector (GI). Final goods are pro-
duced by using all available intermediate goods as inputs. Intermediate goods are either
non-traded (N) or traded internationally (T). Domestic tradables used by domestic ￿rms
are denoted Q, imports from all other country blocs are denoted M. To model realistic
dynamics of trade volumes, we assume that imports are subject to short-term adjustment
costs that temporarily lower the response of import demand to changes in relative prices.
Intermediate goods are available in di⁄erent varieties, each produced by a single ￿rm
under conditions of monopolistic competition worldwide. The prices of intermediate goods
are subject to adjustment costs (nominal price rigidities). These goods are produced with
domestic labor inputs and domestic capital.
Finally, the government purchases the two national ￿nal goods, as well as nontradable
services GN. As treasury, the government ￿nances the excess of its expenditures over net
taxes by borrowing from the domestic private sector, although its net tax rate is set in
such a way as to achieve a stable long-run target debt-to-GDP ratio. As central bank,
the government manages the national short-term nominal interest rate. Monetary policy
is speci￿ed in terms of a credible commitment to an interest rate rule that either targets
in￿ ation or the exchange rate.
2.2 Parameterization of the regional blocs
We refer the reader to FLMP (2006) for a detailed account of the calibration of the model.
In general, we rely on previous work done with the IMF￿ s Global Economy Model (GEM),
as well as estimates from the literature and our own empirical work.
Given the importance of a multi-country setting, some thought has been given to the
composition of the regional blocs: US (the United States), JE (Japan and the euro area
countries), AS (Emerging Asia: China, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan province of China and Thailand) and RC (the Remaining Countries
not considered elsewhere). The steady-state shares of world GDP of the four blocs are,
respectively, 27.9, 32.2, 15.5 and 24.4 percent.
The decision to combine Japan and the euro area into one region re￿ ects, from the van-
tage point of our project, their overlap in key structural characteristics ￿ low productivity
growth, very low in￿ ation (or de￿ ation), and structural rigidities, particularly in the labor
market. Needless to say, Japan and the euro area have exhibited very di⁄erent behaviors
in the past regarding the accumulation of U.S. assets and foreign exchange intervention
policy. However, our prior is that their role in the global rebalancing process will become
comparatively less relevant in the years ahead, especially when compared to Emerging Asia.
This latter bloc groups Asian countries with strong growth and whose currencies have
recently exhibited limited ￿ exibility against the U.S. dollar. Moreover, their labor markets
tend to be rapidly growing and fairly ￿ exible. In addition, the ongoing process of market
liberalization is expected to reduce entry barriers and enhance competition, including in the
major constituents such as India and China.
The Remaining Countries bloc is dominated by the other members of the European
Union (particularly the United Kingdom) and the other major OECD countries such as
4Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Mexico.
We assume that in US, JE and RC the share of liquidity-constrained consumers is 25
percent. The share is much higher in Emerging Asia at 50 percent, re￿ ecting the nascent
or underdeveloped ￿nancial markets for domestic consumers ￿ particularly, in the cases of
China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines.
The rates of time preference underlying steady-state real interest rates are initially set
at 2.7 percent but can di⁄er across countries over the simulation exercise: in the new steady
state US, the most impatient region, has the highest rate of time preference at 3.2 percent;
AS, the most patient, has a rate of 2.6 percent.
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is set at 0.75 in both the tradable
and nontradable sectors. The share of capital in the production functions is calibrated to
achieve a relatively high investment share of GDP in AS, and a low share in US, in line with
their respective historical averages. In all regions, the nontradable sector (e.g., services) is
assumed to be less capital intensive than the tradable sector (e.g., manufacturing). The
depreciation rate is assumed to be two percent per quarter across all regions.
There are separate markups on tradable and non-tradable goods since ￿rms have some
pricing power under monopolistic competition. We use estimates for the price markups from
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) in the case of US, JE and RC. The US bloc has the
lowest price markups, indicating the greatest degree of competition, while Japan and the
euro area have the highest. For AS the markups are indicative of some (very) preliminary
estimates done in the Research Department of the IMF for certain member countries of the
AS bloc.
Similarly, in the labor market agents have some pricing power. For US and JE the
wage markups (16 percent and 30 percent respectively) correspond to Bayoumi, Laxton and
Pesenti (2004).15 We further assume that RC is somewhere in between US and JE, with a
20 percent wage markup, while we assume AS has a labor market as competitive as US.
Monetary policy is parameterized as follows. US, JE and RC are all committed to price
stability, and we assume they follow an in￿ ation-forecast-based rule.16 A representative
calibration is used, with a weight of 0.75 on the lagged short-term interest in order to
impart a high degree of smoothing in the setting of policy rates, and a weight of 2.00 on the
three-quarter ahead gap between in￿ ation and its target. The year-on-year CPI in￿ ation
target is assumed to be ￿xed at two percent for JE and RC, and somewhat higher at 2.5
percent for US. Emerging Asia is assumed to pursue a ￿xed exchange rate regime against
the US currency.17
The main results of the model rely heavily upon the calibration of each region￿ s external
sector. For given steady-state net foreign asset positions for each region, it is straightfor-
ward to calculate the current account and trade balances consistent with long-term stock-
15Their determination of the wage markups is based, in turn, on Jean and Nicoletti (2002), who consider
the wage di⁄erentials for a variety of industries in the United States and six member states of the Euro
Area.
16In￿ation-Forecast-Based rules have been used extensively in central-bank models with in￿ation-targeting
regimes in both advanced and emerging-market economies. See however the discussion in Svensson and
Woodford (2005).
17This should be interpreted as a sensible approximation rather than in literal terms, given that China is
the largest member of AS, and the limited ￿exibility of its currency against the U.S. dollar is at the center of
the current policy debate. Similarly, other members such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore,
Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia attempt to manage the volatility of their currencies vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar.
5￿ ow equilibrium. Using the IMF￿ s Direction of Trade Statistics on merchandise trade, the
national accounts data on the imports of goods and services, and the United Nations￿Com-
modity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) data on each region￿ s imports of consumer and
capital goods, we derive a disaggregated steady-state matrix delineating the pattern and
composition of trade for all regions￿exports and imports. A more aggregated form is found
in Figure 2. On the basis of this trade matrix, we derive all the weight coe¢ cients in the
demand function for imports and the regional composition of imports.
For the corresponding trade elasticities, we assume that the elasticity of substitution
between domestically-produced and imported tradable consumption goods and investment
goods is 2.5 as in Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004). The elasticity of substitution between
goods from di⁄erent regions for imported consumption goods and imported investment goods
is set at 1.5, consistent with existing estimates of import elasticities.
Lastly, we need to calibrate the behavior of net foreign liabilities (NFL). For the long-run
behavior of net foreign assets our prior is that a permanent increase in government debt
by one percentage point of GDP is roughly associated with an increase in the net foreign
liability position of the region by 0.5 percentage points of GDP. Moreover, when the United
States expands its net foreign liabilities as a result of a permanent change in its public
debt, the absorption of new issuance by each region is calibrated (on the basis of net foreign
asset holdings in recent years) by assigning 24 percent of new issuance by US to AS, and
38 percent to each of JE and RC. This calibration implies that for a one percent NFL-to-
GDP shock in US, the AS net-foreign-asset-to-GDP rises the most ￿ around 0.8 percent of
GDP ￿ while JE and RC see their ratios only rise by around 0.3 and 0.5 percent of GDP
respectively.
3 The baseline scenario
The ￿rst step in our analysis is the construction of a baseline scenario of current account
rebalancing for the world economy. The baseline scenario is an attempt to identify the
sources of the current global disequilibrium, accounting for both the shocks emanating from
the United States and the other regions. The purpose of the baseline is to coherently guide
our thinking about the central questions surrounding external developments: What are the
key macroeconomic factors underlying the recent dynamics of current account imbalances
and real exchange rates in the world economy? What assumptions about the size and
persistence of the key underlying shocks are needed to ￿t the facts? What is the range of
possible future trajectories for the relevant macroeconomic variables?
Our baseline is constructed in a similar way as the baseline presented in FLMP (2006)
and International Monetary Fund (2005b, Appendix 1.2), although it is revised and updated
to account for 2005 data. As in our previous work, our working hypotheses are that the
central tendencies underlying the global macroeconomic imbalances in the early 2000s can
be attributed to a combination of six related but distinct ￿ shocks￿ . The ￿rst three shocks
center around the United States economy:
1. Higher US government debt (with initial tax cuts followed by future tax hikes) centered
around the announced plans of the United States federal government.18
18In our simulation the steady-state government-debt-to-GDP ratio in the US increases by 11.5 percentage
points. In the short run the de￿cit-to-GDP ratio for the US peaks at 5 percent after two years, and then
declines to the steady-state value of 2.7 percent of GDP.
62. A permanent decline in the private savings rate in the United States relative to the
rest of the world.19
3. An increase in the demand for US assets abroad, particularly in the AS bloc.20
The next two shocks re￿ ect relative productivity trends in the rest of the world. In the
model, worldwide convergence of productivity growth rates is taken as the anchoring feature
of the economy in the long term. However, prolonged deviations from balanced growth can
play a key role in the unfolding of medium-term rebalancing scenarios, in line with the
asymmetric tendencies observed across regions in the past decade. The shocks are:
4. Very persistent and rapid productivity growth in AS with a central tendency starting
at 5.5 percent per year.21
5. Very persistent and lagging productivity growth in JE with a central tendency of 0.75
percent per year.22
The ￿nal shock attempts to capture structural changes in the pattern of world trade,
including strategies of export promotion in Emerging Asia23 leading to upward shifts in the
range and quality of AS exported varieties, as well as preference shifts toward AS goods in
world demand. The speci￿c way these competitiveness-friendly strategies are introduced is
through:
6. A short-run and temporary positive shock to AS ￿scal policy to promote exports with
a magnitude of 33 percent, associated with an increase in the rest of the world demand
for AS exports by 5 percentage points.24
19The private savings shock has both a temporary and permanent component. The permanent component
is represented by an increase in the rate of time preference in the US relative to the rest of the world of 50
basis points. For the temporary component, we reduce the risk premium on US assets for all regional blocs
by one percent for 25 years.
20The shock is implemented as a change in desired net foreign asset positions. In order to ￿nance the
increase in US net foreign liabilities by 20 percentage points of GDP, AS increases its steady-state holdings
of net foreign assets by 20.5 percentage points of GDP; JE increases its steady-state holdings of net foreign
assets by 5.2 percentage points of GDP; and RC increases its steady-state holdings of net foreign assets by
nine percentage points of GDP.
21Technically, the productivity growth rate in AS di⁄ers between the tradable and nontradable sectors.
For the nontradables sector, productivity grows at three percent per year for eight years. The shock in the
tradable sector is much larger, and much longer. On average, the productivity growth rate in Emerging Asia
is close to 5.5 percent a year at the beginning of the simulation, declining steadily to around 2.25 percent
after 30 years and returning to the trend two percent growth rate two years later.
22To be more precise, we assume that productivity grows at 1.25 percent per year for 13 years in Japan
and the euro area for both the tradable and nontradable sectors, instead of at the world trend growth rate
of two percent.
23This includes tax rebates, accelerated depreciation allowances, and tax holidays.
24This shock is implemented as a positive increase in the AS ￿scal de￿cit above 4 percent of GDP in the
￿rst year, which declines to 1.0 percent of GDP by the end of the ninth year. Afterwards it reverts to the
de￿cit consistent with the original long-run debt target of 24 percent of GDP. At the same time, world
preferences for Asian imports shift up by 5 percentage points of their total imports over roughly three years.
For example, the bias of US consumers for imported goods from Emerging Asia increases from 0.11 to 0.16,
with a corresponding decrease in demand for imported goods from RC from 0.58 to 0.53. This implies that
in the long run, for every additional one hundred units of imports in JE, RW or US, ￿ve of those units now
come from AS rather than from the other trading partners.
7The six aforementioned shocks form the components for our integrated baseline scenario.
As mentioned earlier, the shocks should be viewed as the central tendencies of the scenario,
while the latter is presented more broadly as a range of potential outcomes.
In presenting the baseline scenario, we consider a range of possibilities that accounts
for the degree of uncertainty around the central tendency of the six component shocks. A
high degree of uncertainty, in particular, surrounds the outcome of shocks related to private
savings in the United States, rest of world preferences for holdings of US assets, and the
positive productivity shock in Emerging Asia. For the outcome of shocks related to the U.S.
￿scal policy and lagging productivity in Japan and the euro area, the uncertainty bounds
are more narrow.
The baseline scenario begins in 2006Q1. As mentioned in the introduction, at the begin-
ning of the simulation horizon the model is not in a steady state. Rather, the aforementioned
shocks are assumed to have materialized during the 12 quarters preceding 2006Q1, and at
the beginning of the simulation horizon the world economy is already on a transition path
toward the new steady state. We believe that using this time frame for the combination of
the six shocks (with minor modi￿cations to smooth demand and monetary policy) is the
best strategy to represent our baseline view of the world economy at the beginning of 2006.
Figure 3 presents the baseline scenario in the United States. The pre-2006 time series
are historical data. After 2006Q1 we plot our model-based projections, with the solid lines
referring to the central tendencies and the dotted lines quantifying risks to the basic scenario.
The key features are a gradual build up in US government debt and a decline in net foreign
assets. The exchange rate depreciates gradually to allow the net asset position to stabilize.
This generates the trade surplus required to ￿nance the interest obligations resulting from
the increase in net foreign liabilities. Consumption as a share of GDP is higher in the
short run but is eventually crowded out as US becomes more heavily indebted. In addition,
investment is crowded out by persistent budgetary de￿cits. Overall, the dynamics in the
United States are driven by the current account de￿cit moderating from about 6 percent of
GDP to a sustainable level in 10 years￿time.
To a signi￿cant extent the increased supply of US assets is absorbed by Emerging Asia
(Figure 4). Initially AS runs a large and growing current account surplus. Eventually, the
trade balance turns negative to support the large increase in the net foreign asset position.
To absorb the in￿ ows from the interest payments on its net foreign asset position, the AS
real e⁄ective exchange rate roughly strengthens between 10 and 20 percent over the next ￿ve
years, an appreciation achieved in real terms through higher in￿ ation. Because of limited
exchange rate ￿ exibility, there is an increase in the real interest rate necessary to defend the
stability of the currency. Overall, the economy cools down in the short run, as higher interest
rates dampen investment and real appreciation a⁄ects net exports. However, consumption
increases as a share of GDP in the medium term in anticipation of higher wealth (and lower
saving) in the long run.
Japan and the euro area are relatively stable in terms of adjustment, experiencing few
e⁄ects as Emerging Asia absorbs most of the increased US demand for goods and the
increased supply of US assets (Figure 5). The JE external account is broadly stable going
forward, with only a temporary and small current account improvement until it stabilizes
around 0.5 percent of GDP in about 10 years time.
The Remaining Countries bloc behaves much like Emerging Asia since it has strong
links with the United States (mainly Canada and Mexico). But RC absorbs less US debt
as there is no large underlying positive shock to its preference for US assets. Furthermore,
it experiences relatively little in￿ ation and exhibits a smaller movement in its real e⁄ective
8exchange rate than Emerging Asia because in the simulations it conducts its monetary policy
by targeting in￿ ation rather than the nominal exchange rate.
4 Scenarios involving protectionist policies
In this section we run a set of simulation exercises on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of trade
policies in the global economy. Using a dynamic general-equilibrium model as the analytical
framework of our simulation exercises allows us to consider both the long-term implications
of higher tari⁄s and their dynamic e⁄ects in the short and medium term, as well as what
implications they might have for monetary and ￿scal policies. Since in this venue we are
not concerned with a detailed sectoral account of trade distortions, our methodology lumps
together the myriad of potential protectionist barriers and considers an hypothetical average
tari⁄on imports as the only trade policy instrument.25 We allow however for discrimination
across exporters, in order to track down the e⁄ects of selective intervention against speci￿c
countries, in particular the Emerging Asia (AS) bloc.
We ￿rst use our four-region steady-state model to estimate the long-run e⁄ects of tari⁄s,
obtaining results which are consistent with the optimal tari⁄ argument. Second, to assess
whether or not tari⁄s would be an e⁄ective policy initiative for alleviating current account
imbalances, we examine both the comparative static and dynamic e⁄ects of higher tari⁄s
imposed on imports from emerging Asia. Finally, because the process of globalization may
have been an important factor in increasing competition throughout the world, we complete
our analysis by studying the implications of protectionist pressures toward a partial reversal
of these trends (a ￿ globalization backlash￿leading to higher markups in the tradables sector),
and compare these results with similar scenarios of higher markups in the labor and product
markets.
4.1 A world protectionist surge: Long-term e⁄ects of a hike in tari⁄
rates against all other countries
A considerable amount of research on the impact of tari⁄ and non-tari⁄ barriers has been
carried out in the trade and industrial organization literature, using computational general-
equilibrium models to estimate the e⁄ects predicted by the theory. In this section we build
on this body of work while focusing on a macroeconomic perspective.26 The obvious starting
point in our analysis is to use our model to estimate what would be the long-term response
of key macroeconomic variables to a permanent change in the degree of protectionism world-
wide. These e⁄ects depend on the interaction between the distortions associated with the
imposition of the tari⁄ itself and other distortions in the macroeconomy, either related to
structural factors (e.g. whether the country is ￿ large￿enough to have monopoly power on its
terms of trade) or policy choices (e.g. whether the increased tari⁄ revenue compensates for
a reduction in distortionary taxation on capital and labor incomes for an unchanged level
of government spending, or rather ￿nances additional public absorption GC and GI).
25A summary of several studies on the (static) general equilibrium impact of trade liberalization, in the
context of examining the e⁄ects of the Uruguay Round, can be found in Whalley (2000). The cited studies are
based on multi-sector, multi-region models that uniformly assume Armington-type (CES) trade structures
to examine the long-run trade policy e⁄ects in more detail as well as their global impact.
26Among the classic contributions in this literature see Torrens (1833), Mill (1844), Edgeworth (1894), and
Bickerdike (1907). More recent contributions include Graaf (1950), Johnson (1961), Hamilton and Whalley
(1983), Gross (1987), Markusen and Wigle (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Frensch (2002).
9The important insight from the optimal tari⁄ literature posits that for a single large
country it may be optimal to raise tari⁄s, but when all countries do so they may all lose.
The basic intuition for this result dates back at least to Torrens (1833) and Mill (1844), whose
analysis suggested that a tari⁄ reduces welfare by distorting consumption and production
decisions but can lead to a terms of trade improvement if foreigners reduce their prices facing
lower demand for their exports. This terms-of-trade gain amounts to a transfer of wealth
towards the country imposing the tari⁄, which tends to appreciate its currency. Whether
a country gains or loses as a whole thus depends on the strength of the terms-of-trade
e⁄ect, which in turn depends on the elasticity of substitution between imported goods and
domestically produced tradables.
Table 1 reports estimates of the long-run domestic and spillover e⁄ects of a 10 percentage
point hike in tari⁄s in each of the regions. The tari⁄ hikes are assumed to apply to all
imports, regardless of country of origin. For example, the ￿rst column in Table 1 refers
to the e⁄ects of a 10 percent hike in US tari⁄s against imports from AS, JE and RC, the
second column refers to a tari⁄ in AS against imports from US, JE and RC, etc. The last
column refers to a scenario in which each country simultaneously raises its import barriers
against all other countries (illustrating the e⁄ects of a ￿ trade war￿ ). The results in Table 1
assume that the additional revenue from the tari⁄ hikes is used to reduce the tax rate on
labor income.
The general pattern that emerges from these simulations is that the tari⁄ hike has a
contractionary spillover on the rest of the world (where welfare falls for all consumers)
but an expansionary impact in the protectionist country (who has an increase in welfare),
at least as long as no other country follows suit and ￿ retaliates￿ . Consider for instance
a scenario in which the United States raises its tari⁄s against foreign imports (￿rst col-
umn). In the United States itself, real GDP rises permanently by 1.1 percent, consumption
by 1.4 percent and labor e⁄ort by a half percentage point, while the real exchange rate
appreciates by 6.3 percent. On impact, the tari⁄ alters the relative price of imported ver-
sus domestically-produced goods. Because of the relatively high elasticity of substitution
between domestically-produced and imported goods, there is a strong shift into domestic
production, leading to an increase in labor demand. Higher consumption re￿ ects these labor
income gains as well as the wealth e⁄ect from the change in the terms of trade, discussed
above. Conversely, in the rest of the world there is a generalized output fall (1.0 percent
in Emerging Asia, 0.4 percent in the JE bloc, and 1.1 in the rest of the world) with real
exchange rate depreciations.
Similar considerations hold for the next three columns, showing the e⁄ects of protection-
ist hikes in AS, JE and RC respectively. The largest expansionary e⁄ect on the domestic
economy is found in the AS case, the smallest in the US case. This is not surprising, as
the direct e⁄ects of tari⁄s are highly related to the degree of openness of the respective
economies, and we should expect them to be larger in regions that have greater exposure to
trade. In fact, as shown in the very last row of Table 1, imports represent about 26 percent
of GDP in Emerging Asia, 24 percent in the Remaining Countries bloc, 16 percent in Japan
and the euro area, and only 12 percent in the United States. Obviously, tari⁄ revenue as a
share of GDP is higher in the countries that have greater openness.
The size of the protectionist spillovers to the rest of the world di⁄er from case to case.
For instance, a tari⁄hike in the United States has a large contractionary impact in Emerging
Asia (1.0 percent GDP reduction), but a tari⁄ hike in Emerging Asia has relatively small
repercussions on the US economy (0.3 percent GDP reduction). The worst GDP spillovers
are found in the JE bloc when the Remaining Countries hike their tari⁄s (output falls by
101.4 percent) and in the Emerging Asia bloc as a result of protectionism in Japan and the
euro area.
In sum, our results are suggestive that terms of trade e⁄ects may be quantitatively
relevant and each country may be tempted to raise tari⁄s.27 Note, however, that when
all countries hike tari⁄s by equal amounts, these terms-of-trade e⁄ects work to o⁄set each
other, so that the only macroeconomic e⁄ects left are the distortions in consumption and
production decisions. In other words, nobody wins when protectionism surges worldwide.
As the last column of Table 1 reports, if all countries hike their tari⁄ rates simultaneously,
we see a fall in welfare of 0.1 percent for the majority of consumers (i.e. the forward-looking
consumers).28 Interestingly, the liquidity-constrained consumers actually see an increase in
their welfare of 0.4 percent, but this result stems partially from the fact that, by construction,
the increase in tari⁄s has the positive e⁄ect of reducing distortionary taxation in the labor
market, thus boosting labor e⁄ort and employment in steady state (and the consumption
of liquidity-constrained agents, whose wealth depends solely on labor income). Moreover,
output contracts everywhere. Emerging Asia, Japan and the euro area are the main victims
(-1.1 percent), while the United States remains almost unscathed (-0.2 percent).29 Again,
the muted output e⁄ects are attributable to the reduction in the level of labor taxation
resulting from the new revenue stream from the imposition of tari⁄s.
To control for these labor-supply e⁄ects, in Table 2 we consider the case in which higher
tari⁄ revenue increases government absorption that does not contribute directly to either
productive capacity or the welfare of consumers. Once again, in all cases the country that
imposes the tari⁄ bene￿ts from a real exchange rate appreciation and higher output when-
ever it is the only country that raises the tari⁄. And in all cases this increase in output comes
at the expense of a contraction in those countries that face the higher tari⁄ rates and a real
depreciation in their exchange rate. Welfare also falls for both types of consumers. But in
Table 2 there are signi￿cant negative crowding-out e⁄ects on private consumption, invest-
ment and output relative to Table 1. Labor e⁄ort falls everywhere in the world economy,
no matter which country adopts a protectionist posture. Not surprisingly, the implications
of a trade war (last column) worsen signi￿cantly. Welfare falls worldwide by 2.4 percent
for forward-looking consumers and 2.7 percent for liquidity-constrained consumers. In the
AS bloc, consumption falls by 6.2 percent in Table 2 (as opposed to only 0.4 percent in
Table 1). In Japan and the euro area consumption falls by 4.5 percent (as opposed to 0.8
percent). Even in the United States, consumption now falls by 2.4 percent (it was virtually
unchanged in Table 1).
In both Tables 1 and 2 there are very small e⁄ects on the long-run current account
balance as a share of GDP. This should be expected: even though our model allows for
steady-state budgetary non-neutralities, in our simulation exercises tari⁄s do not a⁄ect in-
27The size of the optimal tari⁄ may well di⁄er across importers. In the theoretical trade literature it has
been shown that the optimal tari⁄ rate is inversely related to the export supply elasticities ￿ see Bickerdike
(1907) and Grossman and Helpman (1995). Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2006) provide some empirical
support for this view by showing that countries with higher market power have higher average tari⁄ rates.
28Welfare here is derived from the two utility functions, one for each type of consumer: forward-looking
ones, who own all bonds and the capital stock, and liquidity-constrained ones. Welfare is measured in terms
of consumption equivalents, de￿ned as the amount of consumption required to achieve a certain level of
utility, holding labor supply (leisure) at the pre-tari⁄ steady-state level.
29In Whalley (2000), the cited trade policy e⁄ects or gains in that case (in terms of global output) range
from 0.2 to 1.4 percent from the Uruguay Round liberalization￿ whereby developed countries reduce average
tari⁄s by 36 percent over 6 years, and developing countries by 24 percent over 10 years.
11tertemporal decisions and therefore have no signi￿cant and permanent e⁄ects on current
account balances. However, this result should be accompanied by the caveat that in alter-
native scenarios import tari⁄s may play some role as long as the additional tax revenue is
used to reduce the government-debt-to-GDP ratio and the level of national savings in the
economy where the tari⁄ is imposed.
4.2 Selective trade policies: Long-term and dynamic e⁄ects of a
hike in tari⁄ rates against Emerging Asia
The next set of experiments consider both the comparative static and dynamic e⁄ects of
imposing tari⁄s exclusively on imports from emerging Asia. In all cases the increase in tari⁄
revenue is used to reduce the tax rate on labor income, as in Table 1.
The ￿rst three columns in Table 3 report the comparative-static e⁄ects under the as-
sumption that these policies are implemented by each country bloc separately. The last
column reports the results when all regions impose higher tari⁄s on imports from emerging
Asia. The results of these simulations are similar to the previous ￿ndings in Table 1 above,
but the orders of magnitudes are smaller as only imports from AS are now a⁄ected by the
protectionist surge. Output, consumption and employment expand in the country that im-
poses the tari⁄. AS is worse o⁄, more when the JE trading partners hike their tari⁄s (AS
consumption falls by 1.6 percent) than when US does so (AS consumption falls by 1.1 per-
cent). Again the main channel through which such beggar-thy-neighbor policies are e⁄ective
is through a real appreciation in the country that imposes the tari⁄ and a depreciation in
the country that is subjected to the higher tari⁄.
There are also some interesting third country e⁄ects. In general, the real exchange also
tends to depreciate in the two other countries that are not a⁄ected by the tari⁄ hikes. For
example, an increase in tari⁄s in the United States on imported goods from emerging Asia
results in a depreciation of the real e⁄ective exchange rate not only in emerging Asia (1.4
percent), but also in the Japan-euro area bloc (0.2 percent) and the Remaining Countries
bloc (0.2 percent). These third country e⁄ects can be signi￿cant in some cases, suggesting
that other regions can lose ￿ or possibly even bene￿t depending on their openness and
trade patterns ￿ when two regions engage in a trade war.
Moving now to a more detailed assessment of the short-run implications of trade pro-
tection against emerging Asia, Figures 6 to 9 report the dynamic e⁄ects of a generalized
(US/JE/RC) 10 percent tari⁄hike against AS on GDP, consumption, investment, the trade
balance and the current account balance (both as a percentage of GDP), the short-term
interest rate, in￿ ation and the real e⁄ective exchange rate in each country bloc. Besides the
change in trade policies, the scenario is exactly as described in Section 3 above, and the
time series charts are plotted as percentage deviations from the aforementioned baseline.
The long-run endpoints of these charts are consistent with the last column of Table 3.
Emerging Asia experiences a large contraction in consumption, investment and GDP in
both the short run and long run (Figure 6, second chart). The real e⁄ective exchange rate
depreciates over time and is 4.5 percent higher in the long run (Figure 9, second chart).
This results in both a trade and current account de￿cit (relative to baseline) that is over
one percent of GDP in the short run (Figure 7, second chart). This e⁄ect is only temporary
and disappears over time, as AS consumers do not adjust their saving behavior in response
to changes in the relative prices a⁄ected by higher tari⁄s. As indicated earlier, if the tari⁄
hike was used to reduce government debt, the non-Ricardian properties of the model would
result in an increase in both national and world savings, thus a permanent increase in the
12current account balance for the country that imposed the tari⁄. However, these e⁄ects
would be true for any tax or expenditure instrument and are not directly attributable to
the change in one instrument or another; rather, they would be simply a consequence of the
permanent change in the target level of government debt.
The responses in the other regions go in the opposite direction. These countries bene￿t
from consumption and GDP increases both in the short and long run (Figure 6), and their
real exchange rates appreciate (Figure 9). Trade policy is the main factor underlying price
dynamics, as the countries that impose the tari⁄witness a positive in￿ ationary impulse in the
short run and short-term interest rates rise to bring in￿ ation closer to desired levels (Figure
8). In emerging Asia, instead, in￿ ation falls by over 3 percentage points below baseline in
the short run. Underlying this result is the assumption that emerging Asia maintains a
regime of limited exchange rate ￿ exibility against the US currency, and consequently the
depreciation in its real e⁄ective exchange rate can only be brought about by lower in￿ ation
and not the weakening of its nominal exchange rate.
In the protectionist countries there is a temporary improvement in both the trade and
current account balances (Figure 7). Given their relevance for the ongoing rebalancing
debate, these results are worth emphasizing in some detail. According to our projections, a
generalized 10 percent hike against emerging Asia improves the US current account balance
as a share of GDP by a mere 0.1 percentage point. The e⁄ect disappears after about two
years, and in the absence of further adjustment in net saving, it may even revert sign.
Similar e⁄ects hold in JE and the RC blocs. Even if one was willing to consider a world
tari⁄ hike three times as large as the one considered in our simulations (and a 30 percent
hike certainly represents an upper bound under current circumstances), a surge in world
protectionism would at best improve current accounts by half percentage points of GDP
over a business-cycle horizon. This hardly sounds like the ultimate recipe to defuse global
imbalances.
In Figures 10 to 13 we repeat the analysis above, except this time the tari⁄ hike is as-
sumed to take place exclusively in the US bloc. The tari⁄has a similar small and temporary
positive e⁄ect on the US trade and current account balances (Figure 11), but what is more
interesting is that it results in negative spillover e⁄ects on economic activity in the two
￿ bystander￿regions (Japan, euro area and remaining countries) even though tari⁄s are only
raised on imported goods from emerging Asia. Indeed, for more open economies such as the
RC bloc these e⁄ects are signi￿cant on both consumption, investment and GDP (Figure 10,
bottom chart).
The previous analysis focused on tari⁄ hikes on imported goods from emerging Asia and
showed that such policies are unlikely to be quantitatively successful in reducing current
account imbalances on a sustainable basis. More importantly, because trade policies can
only enhance welfare at the expense of the country against which the tari⁄ hike is being
levied, such policies are likely to result in retaliation and protectionist escalades. To quantify
this point, we consider the long-term e⁄ects of tari⁄s being imposed on imported goods from
the United States ￿ see Table 4. As expected the real exchange rate depreciates in the
United States and appreciates in the countries that are imposing the tari⁄s. This results in
a permanent reduction in US consumer welfare, consumption and GDP. Interestingly, there
are also signi￿cant third-country e⁄ects. For example, when the Remaining Countries bloc
imposes a tari⁄ on imports from the United States, this has signi￿cant negative spillover
e⁄ects on emerging Asia.
134.3 A globalization backlash: Long-term e⁄ects of a reversal of
competition-friendly policies
Among the purported bene￿ts of the process of globalization is the increase in competition
and the resulting reduction of markups in both product and labor markets worldwide. An
important risk going forward is that protectionist policies induced by trade imbalances
could reverse this trend and result in higher market power in import-competing sectors.
This is a di⁄erent but related protectionist threat relative to the ones considered above,
whose quantitative relevance needs to be assessed in the context of our analysis. This
can be motivated by the recognition that often times protectionist measures do not take
the explicit form of (say) ad valorem tari⁄s but less transparent or even hidden non-tari⁄
barriers (NTBs). By erecting such trade barriers or frictions, these insular policies can
e⁄ectively reduce market access and, thus, the degree of competition in the marketplace.
Although there is less agreement on how this should be precisely modeled, a reasonable
formulation pursued here is via a reversal of competition-friendly policies.30
Extending previous work in this area, in this section we take wage and price markups as
proxies for the degree of competition in domestic labor and product markets, and consider
the implications of changes in markups and their spillover e⁄ects to other regions of the
world.31 In particular, we consider a scenario in which a ￿ globalization backlash￿leads to
a moderate increase in markups by 5 percentage points in the tradables sector T (Table
5). We compare these results with similar scenarios leading to changes in markups in the
nontradables sectors N (Table 6) as well as in the market for labor (Table 7).
The key message is that in every case there are fairly large real income and consumption
losses (mirrored in consumer welfare, particularly for the liquidity-constrained consumers),
and in most cases signi￿cant negative spillover e⁄ects to the rest of the world. Consider ￿rst
Table 5. A markup increase in the US tradables sector (￿rst column) reduces welfare by 0.9
percent for forward-looking consumers, and 3.5 percent for liquidity-constrained consumers
in the United States (and a reduction between 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent for both types
of consumers in the rest of the world). Furthermore, there are reductions in US output
by 1.3 percent and US consumption by 1 percent, causing output losses between 0.1 and
0.2 percent in the other regions. The negative spillover e⁄ects are even larger when the
increase in markups occurs in the Japan and euro area bloc (third column) or the Remaining
Countries bloc (fourth column). The reduction in purchasing power associated with higher
markups can result in a fall in consumption by as much as 0.5 percent in regions such as
emerging Asia. A generalized 5 percent increase in price markups worldwide (last column)
reduces AS output by more than 3 percent, JE output by 2.2 percent and US output by 1.7
percent.
Higher markups in the nontradables and labor markets may have even larger domestic
e⁄ects, but not surprisingly the negative spillover e⁄ects tend to be smaller than when the
increases occur in the markets for tradable goods and services. For example, a 5 percent
increase in markups in the tradables sector of the United States (Table 5, ￿rst column)
reduces its consumption by 1.0 percent, but also results in a reduction in consumption of
30Unlike the case of tari⁄s, treatment of NTBs has been hampered by a lack of common methodological
approaches to evaluate them, both conceptually and empirically. See UNCTAD (2005) for a list of possible
NTBs and a review of the issues surrounding their scope, identi￿cation, classi￿cation, and impact.
31Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2005) use a simpler but similar model to study the e⁄ects of competition-
friendly reforms in the euro area. The most relevant di⁄erence with respect to their approach is that our
model encompasses a nontradables sector.
140.3 percent in both emerging Asia and the Remaining Countries blocs. When the same
increase materializes in the nontradables sector (Table 6, ￿rst column), it results in a 1.5
percent reduction in consumption in the United States, a 0.1 percent fall in emerging Asia
and no signi￿cant e⁄ects in the other regions. When the increase occurs in the US labor
market (Table 7, ￿rst column), US consumption falls by 1.5 percent and by 0.1 percent
everywhere else in the global economy.
The long-term e⁄ects on the current account balance are insigni￿cant, for precisely the
same reason why they were not signi￿cant in the case of a hike in tari⁄s, as such changes
do not result in a shift in desired saving behavior. However, changes in markups can have
signi￿cant short-term e⁄ects on the current account balance as consumption and investment
take time to adjust to their new equilibrium levels.
The long-term e⁄ects on the real exchange rate can be quite signi￿cant, with responses
similar to the ones associated with sector-speci￿c shocks to productivity. In all cases a
positive shock to the markup results in a depreciation of the country￿ s real exchange rate
when the shock is in the tradables sector, and an appreciation when the shock is in the
nontradables sector. This is consistent with the standard Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ects in multi-
sector open economy models.
5 Conclusion
While the apparent ability of the global economy to ￿nance large global imbalances may
comfort some, rising protectionism ￿ in response to years of persistent and widening ex-
ternal imbalances ￿ is a clear and present danger. The temptation for countries to resort
to beggar-thy-neighbor policies to remedy protracted current account de￿cits through trade
and commercial policies ￿ including hiking import tari⁄s or their equivalent trade barriers
￿ is understandable, but short-sighted.
The scenario analysis in this paper shows that a country acting unilaterally may stand
to gain through improving its terms of trade, at the expense of others, as the optimal
tari⁄ literature would suggest. This is true with either uniform or discriminating tari⁄
increases. But the trade balance improvements are short-lived (given public and external
indebtedness), and the prospect of trade retaliation underscores the potentially deleterious
consequences for the overall global economy.
According to our projections, a generalized 10 percent hike against emerging Asia im-
proves the US current account balance as a share of GDP by a mere 0.1 percentage point.
The e⁄ect disappears after about two years, and in the absence of further adjustment in net
saving, it may even revert sign. Similar e⁄ects hold in the rest of the world. Moreover, there
are unintended third-country e⁄ects on ￿ bystander￿countries, opening the likely possibility
that any such actions would be matched by countervailing trade policy actions in partner
countries, undermining the initial gains and leaving the world worse o⁄ than before. And
the world contraction would be even more substantial if protectionist pressures took the
form of a backlash against competition-friendly reforms in import-competing sectors. At
the end of the day, a protectionist surge would lower global growth leaving global imbalances
unresolved.
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21Figure 3: The Baseline Scenario - United States
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22Figure 4: The Baseline Scenario - Emerging Asia
(Levels)
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23Figure 5: The Baseline Scenario - Japan and the Euro Area
(Levels)
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24Figure 6: All Regions Impose Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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25Figure 7: All Regions Impose Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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26Figure 8: All Regions Impose Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia









0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Nominal Interest Rate Year-on-Year Inflation
United States









0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Nominal Interest Rate Year-on-Year Inflation
Emerging Asia









0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Nominal Interest Rate Year-on-Year Inflation
Japan / Euro Area









0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Nominal Interest Rate Year-on-Year Inflation
Remaining Countries
(deviations in percentage points)
27Figure 9: All Regions Impose Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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28Figure 10: United States Imposes Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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29Figure 11: United States Imposes Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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30Figure 12: United States Imposes Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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31Figure 13: United States Imposes Tari⁄s on Emerging Asia
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32Table 1: E⁄ects of a 10 Percentage Point Hike in Tari⁄ Rates
(Additional Revenue Used to Reduce Labor Tax Rates)
E⁄ects of Tari⁄ Hikes in:
US AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP 1.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers 1.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1
Liquidity-constrained Consumers 1.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 0.4
Consumption 1.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1
Investment 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9
Labor E⁄ort 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -6.3 1.4 2.0 3.2 -0.0
Tari⁄s/GDP 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -1.0 2.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.1
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.0 3.1 -1.3 -1.2 -0.6
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.1 4.8 -1.4 -1.3 0.7
Consumption -1.1 3.4 -1.4 -1.2 -0.4
Investment -0.7 0.0 -1.0 -0.8 -2.5
Labor E⁄ort -0.3 1.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.2
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.6 -6.4 2.1 2.1 -0.8
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 2.3
Current Account/GDP 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.4 -0.5 1.2 -1.4 -1.1
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.5 -0.5 1.6 -1.4 -0.8
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.5 -0.5 3.0 -1.4 0.5
Consumption -0.5 -0.5 1.7 -1.4 -0.8
Investment -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.3 -2.3
Labor E⁄ort -0.1 -0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.6 1.5 -5.3 4.0 1.4
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.2
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -1.1 -0.3 -1.2 2.2 -0.5
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.1 -0.4 -1.3 2.8 -0.1
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.2 -0.4 -1.3 4.2 1.1
Consumption -1.1 -0.4 -1.3 2.9 -0.1
Investment -0.8 -0.2 -0.9 0.2 -1.7
Labor E⁄ort -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 1.2 0.3
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 2.0 0.8 2.6 -6.0 -0.8
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.9
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0
Memo Item:
Baseline Import Share 12.1 26.2 15.8 24.3
33Table 2: E⁄ects of a 10 Percentage Point Hike in Tari⁄ Rates
(Additional Revenue Used to Increase Government Absorption)
E⁄ects of Tari⁄ Hikes in:
US AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -1.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -2.4
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 -2.7
Consumption -1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -2.4
Investment -0.8 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -1.8
Labor E⁄ort -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -6.5 1.5 2.2 3.5 0.3
Tari⁄s/GDP 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -1.0 0.5 -1.4 -1.2 -3.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.1 -2.3 -1.5 -1.3 -6.1
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.2 -2.9 -1.6 -1.4 -6.8
Consumption -1.1 -2.4 -1.5 -1.4 -6.2
Investment -0.8 -1.9 -1.2 -0.9 -4.6
Labor E⁄ort -0.3 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -2.0
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.7 -7.1 2.3 2.3 -1.0
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 2.3
Current Account/GDP 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -1.6 -2.8
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.5 -0.6 -2.0 -1.6 -4.5
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.5 -0.6 -2.7 -1.5 -5.2
Consumption -0.5 -0.6 -2.0 -1.6 -4.5
Investment -0.4 -0.5 -1.7 -1.4 -3.9
Labor E⁄ort -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.4 -1.5
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.6 1.6 -5.9 4.4 1.5
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.2
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -1.1 -0.4 -1.4 0.5 -2.4
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.2 -0.4 -1.5 -2.0 -5.0
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.2 -0.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.7
Consumption -1.2 -0.4 -1.5 -2.0 -5.0
Investment -0.8 -0.2 -1.1 -1.6 -3.6
Labor E⁄ort -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.7
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 2.1 0.9 2.9 -6.6 -1.0
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.9
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0
Memo Item:
Baseline Import Share 12.1 26.2 15.8 24.3
34Table 3: E⁄ects of a 10 Percentage Point Hike in Tari⁄ Rates on Import Goods from
Emerging Asia
(Additional Revenue Used to Reduce Labor Tax Rates)
E⁄ects of Tari⁄ Hikes in:
US JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Liquidity-constrained Consumers 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5
Consumption 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
Investment 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Labor E⁄ort 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -1.5 0.2 -0.0 -1.4
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -1.1 -1.4 -0.8 -3.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.1 -1.6 -0.8 -3.5
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.2 -1.6 -0.9 -3.7
Consumption -1.1 -1.6 -0.8 -3.6
Investment -0.8 -1.2 -0.6 -2.6
Labor E⁄ort -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -1.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.4 2.0 1.0 4.5
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.0 0.3 -0.0 0.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.0 0.7 -0.0 0.7
Consumption -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4
Investment -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.2
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.2 -1.2 0.1 -1.1
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.1
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.1
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2
Consumption -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1
Investment -0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.0
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.2
Tari⁄s/GDP 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Memo Item:
Baseline Import Share from Emerging Asia 2.7 3.3 2.2
35Table 4: E⁄ects of a 10 Percentage Point Hike in Tari⁄Rates on Import Goods from United
States
(Additional Revenue Used to Reduce Labor Tax Rates)
E⁄ects of Tari⁄ Hikes in:
AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -1.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4
Consumption -0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4
Investment -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0
Labor E⁄ort -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.9 1.3 3.0 5.4
Current Account/GDP -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.3
Liquidity-constrained Consumers 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.6
Consumption 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.3
Investment 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Labor E⁄ort 0.3 -0.0 -0.1 0.2
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -1.3 0.2 0.5 -0.8
Current Account/GDP -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.0 0.3 -0.0 0.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.0 0.3 -0.0 0.3
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6
Consumption -0.0 0.3 -0.0 0.3
Investment -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.0
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.0 -1.1 0.2 -0.9
Current Account/GDP -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP 0.0 -0.0 0.7 0.7
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers 0.0 -0.0 0.9 1.0
Liquidity-constrained Consumers 0.0 -0.0 1.4 1.5
Consumption 0.0 -0.0 0.9 1.0
Investment 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Labor E⁄ort 0.0 -0.0 0.4 0.4
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.0 0.1 -2.2 -2.2
Current Account/GDP -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Memo Item:
Baseline Import Share from United States 6.1 2.5 8.4
36Table 5: E⁄ects of Higher Markups in the Tradables Sector
E⁄ects of Higher Markups in:
US AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP -1.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.7
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.3
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -3.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -3.9
Consumption -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.5
Investment -2.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -2.5
Labor E⁄ort -1.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.1
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 2.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 0.8
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -0.2 -2.2 -0.4 -0.4 -3.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.6
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.3 -5.8 -0.5 -0.4 -6.9
Consumption -0.3 -1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -2.5
Investment -0.2 -4.0 -0.4 -0.3 -4.8
Labor E⁄ort -0.1 -1.7 -0.1 -0.1 -2.0
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -0.4 0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.1 -0.2 -1.5 -0.4 -2.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -1.9
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -0.2 -4.5 -0.4 -5.1
Consumption -0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -0.4 -2.0
Investment -0.1 -0.1 -2.3 -0.4 -2.9
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -0.0 -1.3 -0.1 -1.5
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -0.3 -0.2 1.9 -0.7 0.6
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.5 -2.3
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -1.8
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -4.5 -5.4
Consumption -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -2.0
Investment -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -2.9 -3.5
Labor E⁄ort -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -1.3 -1.6
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -0.8 0.0 -1.1 1.4 -0.6
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
37Table 6: E⁄ects of Higher Markups in the Non-Tradables Sector
E⁄ects of Higher Markups in:
US AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP -2.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -2.2
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.3 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.4
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -5.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -5.6
Consumption -1.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.6
Investment -4.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -4.3
Labor E⁄ort -1.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.6
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -3.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 -0.4
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -0.1 -1.5 -0.1 -0.1 -1.7
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -3.7 -0.1 -0.1 -4.0
Consumption -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1
Investment -0.0 -3.0 -0.1 -0.1 -3.2
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -1.1 -0.0 -0.0 -1.2
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.7 -2.2 1.1 1.0 0.6
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.0 -0.0 -2.3 -0.1 -2.5
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.0 -0.0 -1.5 -0.1 -1.6
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.0 -0.0 -6.5 -0.1 -6.6
Consumption -0.0 -0.0 -1.7 -0.1 -1.8
Investment -0.0 -0.0 -4.3 -0.1 -4.4
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -0.0 -1.9 -0.0 -1.9
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.5 0.5 -2.8 1.5 -0.3
Current Account/GDP 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.8 -1.9
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -1.1
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -4.8 -4.9
Consumption -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.1 -1.3
Investment -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -3.6 -3.7
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.4 -1.4
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 1.1 0.2 1.5 -2.5 0.2
Current Account/GDP 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
38Table 7: E⁄ects of Higher Markups in the Labor Market
E⁄ects of Higher Markups in:
US AS JE RC ALL
United States (US):
Real GDP -1.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.7
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -1.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.7
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -1.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.7
Consumption -1.5 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.7
Investment -1.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.7
Labor E⁄ort -1.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -1.7
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.0
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
Emerging Asia (AS):
Real GDP -0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.7
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6
Consumption -0.1 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6
Investment -0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1 -1.7
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -1.5 -0.1 -0.0 -1.7
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.2 -0.0
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
Japan/Euro Area (JE):
Real GDP -0.0 -0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.5
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.5
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.5
Consumption -0.1 -0.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.5
Investment -0.0 -0.0 -1.3 -0.1 -1.5
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -0.0 -1.4 -0.0 -1.5
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.1
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
Remaining Countries (RC):
Real GDP -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -1.3 -1.6
Welfare (Consumption Equiv.)
Forward-looking Consumers -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -1.6
Liquidity-constrained Consumers -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -1.6
Consumption -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -1.6
Investment -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -1.4 -1.6
Labor E⁄ort -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -1.5 -1.6
Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.0
Current Account/GDP -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
39Appendix: Theoretical framework
In this Appendix we provide a brief but comprehensive overview of the model used in
our scenario analysis. In some sections we focus on country-speci￿c equations that are
independent of foreign variables, thus qualitatively similar across countries. We therefore
drop country indexes for notational simplicity, with the understanding that all countries are
analogously characterized. In the sections involving international transactions, instead, we
adopt a more general notation that includes country indexes.
The world economy consists of four regional blocs (￿ countries￿ ): US (United States), JE
(Japan and euro area), AS (Emerging Asia), and RC (Remaining Countries). The size of
the world economy is normalized to one. The size of each country H is denoted sH, with
0 < sH < 1 and
P
H sH = 1 for H 2 fUS;JE;AS;RCg.
There is a common trend for the world economy (the variable TREND), whose gross
rate of growth between time t and time ￿ is denoted gt;￿. All quantity variables in the model
are expressed in detrended terms, that is as ratios relative to TREND.
Final goods
In each country there is a continuum of symmetric ￿rms producing two ￿nal goods, A
(the consumption good) and E (the investment good) under perfect competition. As a
convention throughout the model, in each country A is the numeraire of the economy and
all national prices are expressed in terms of domestic consumption units, that is relative to
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).1 For instance, pE denotes the price of one unit of E in
terms of A. Also we denote the CPI in￿ ation rate between time t and time ￿ with ￿t;￿. The





Consider ￿rst the consumption sector. Each ￿rm is indexed by x 2 [0;s], where s is the
country size. Firm x￿ s output at time (quarter) t is denoted At(x). The consumption good






























Three intermediate inputs are used in the production of the consumption good A: a basket
NA of nontradable goods, a basket QA of domestic tradable goods, and a basket MA of
imported goods. The elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is "A > 0,
and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradables is ￿A > 0. The
weights of the three inputs are, respectively, 1￿￿A, ￿A￿A and ￿A (1 ￿ ￿A) with 0 < ￿A;￿A <
1.
Firm x takes as given the prices of the three inputs and minimizes its costs subject to
the technological constraint (A.2). Cost minimization implies that ￿rm x￿ s demands for
1By transforming all prices in relative terms and all quantities in detrended terms we avoid dealing with



















where pN, pQ and pMA are the relative prices of the inputs in terms of consumption baskets,










The production technologies in the consumption and investment sectors can be quantita-
tively di⁄erent but their formal characterizations are similar, with self-explanatory changes
in notation. For instance, a ￿rm e 2 [0;s], that produces the investment good, demands







Note that pMA and pME are sector-speci￿c as they re￿ ect the di⁄erent composition of
imports in the two sectors, while pN and pQ are identical across sectors.
Demand for domestic intermediate goods
Intermediate inputs come in di⁄erent varieties (brands) and are produced under conditions
of monopolistic competition. In each country there are two kinds of intermediate goods,
tradables and nontradables. Each kind is de￿ned over a continuum of mass s. Without loss
of generality, we assume that each nontradable good is produced by a single domestic ￿rm
indexed by n 2 [0;s], and each tradable good is produced by a ￿rm h 2 [0;s].
Focusing ￿rst on the basket NA, this is a CES index of all domestic varieties of nontrad-
ables. Denoting as NA (n;x) the demand by ￿rm x of an intermediate good produced by















where ￿N;t > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among intermediate non-tradables.






















The basket NE is similarly characterized. Aggregating across ￿rms,2 and accounting for
public demand of nontradables ￿ here assumed to have the same composition as private
2The convention throughout the model is that variables which are not explicitly indexed to ￿rms or
households are expressed in per-capita (average) terms. For instance, At ￿ (1=s)
R s
0 At(x)dx.











(NA;t + NE;t + GN;t) (A.11)












(QA;t + QE;t): (A.12)
Demand for imports
The derivation of the foreign demand schedule for good h is analytically more complex but,
as we show in (A.21) at the end of this section, it shares the same functional form as (A.11)
and (A.12) above and can be written as a function of the relative price of good h (with
elasticity ￿T;t) and total foreign demand for imports.
We focus ￿rst on import demand in the consumption good sector. Since we deal with
goods produced in di⁄erent countries, we need to introduce explicit country indexes in our
notation. Thus, in this section H will refer to a speci￿c country, and J will refer to each of
the other countries di⁄erent from H.
Denote the representative ￿rm in the consumption sector as xH 2 [0;sH]. Its imports
MH





























0 ￿ bH;J ￿ 1;
X
J6=H
bH;J = 1 (A.14)
In (A.13) above ￿H
A is country H￿ s elasticity of substitution across exporters: the higher
is ￿H
A, the easier it is for ￿rm xH to replace imports from one country with imports from
another. The parameters b
H;J
A determine the composition of the import basket across coun-
tries. M
H;J
A (xH) denotes imports from country J by ￿rm xH located in country H.
The response of imports to changes in fundamentals and their price elasticities are typ-
ically estimated to be smaller in the short term than in the long run. To model realistic
dynamics of imports volumes, such as delayed and sluggish adjustment to changes in rela-
tive prices, we assume that imports are subject to adjustment costs ￿
H;J
MA. These costs are
speci￿ed in terms of import shares relative to ￿rm xH￿ s output and can be di⁄erent across























































MA ￿ 0. The speci￿cation is such that ￿
H;J












3Relative to the quadratic speci￿cation adopted e.g. in Laxton and Pesenti (2003), this parameterization
of import adjustment costs allows the non-linear model to deal with potentially large shocks.
iiiDenoting p
H;J
M the price in country H of a basket of intermediate inputs imported from



































MA (xH) is the ￿rst derivative of ￿
H;J
MA(xH) with respect to M
H;J
A (xH). The import
price de￿ ator in the consumption sector, pH




























In principle, the cost-minimizing import price pH
MA(xH) is ￿rm-speci￿c, as it depends on ￿rm
xH￿ s import shares. To the extent that all ￿rms xH are symmetric within the consumption
sector, however, there will be a unique import price pH
MA.5
Consider now the basket M
H;J
A (xH) in some detail. In analogy with (A.8) above, it is
a CES index of all varieties of tradable intermediate goods produced by ￿rms hJ operating





the demand by ￿rm

































T > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate tradables, the same
elasticity entering (A.12) in country J.
The cost-minimizing ￿rm xH takes as given the prices of the imported goods pH(hJ)










































The import demand schedules in the investment good sector can be derived in perfect
analogy with the analysis above. As a last step, we can derive country J￿ s demand schedule
for country H￿ s intermediate good hH, that is, the analog of (A.12). Aggregating across
4The de￿ator pH






A (xH) subject to (A.13).

















































Supply of intermediate goods
















Firm n uses labor ‘(n) and capital K(n) to produce N(n) units of its variety. ￿N > 0 is the
elasticity of input substitution, and ZN is a productivity shock common to all producers of
nontradables.6
























Labor inputs are di⁄erentiated and come in di⁄erent varieties (skills). Each input is
associated to one household, de￿ned over a continuum of mass equal to the country size
and indexed by j 2 [0;s]. As discussed below, there are two types of households, LC-type
households and FL-type households. FL-type households represents a share (1 ￿ sLC) of
domestic households and are indexed by j 2 [0;s(1 ￿ sLC)]. LC-type households represent
a share sLC of domestic households and are indexed by j 2 (s(1 ￿ sLC);s].
















where ‘LC(n) is a basket of LC-type labor inputs, ‘FL(n) a basket of FL-type inputs, and















6Recall that a productivity shock is de￿ned as a deviation from the common world trend. Variants of
the model allow for the possibility of shocks to labor productivity or capital productivity instead of total
factor productivity.
7Following the notational convention regarding prices, mct, wt and rt denote marginal costs, wages and















where ‘(n;j) is the demand of labor input of type j by the producer of good n and
 FL; LC > 1 are the elasticities of substitution among varieties of labor inputs.
Cost minimization implies that ‘(n;j) is a function of the relative wages:
‘t(n;j) =
8
> > > <




















‘t(n) for LC inputs
(A.28)































Similar considerations hold for the production of tradables. We denote by T(h) the
supply of each intermediate tradable h. Using self-explanatory notation, we have:















where ZT is total factor productivity. Aggregating across ￿rms, we obtain the total demand
































(1 ￿ sLC)‘t (A.33)


































viPrice setting in the nontradables sector
Consider now pro￿t maximization in the intermediate nontradables sector. Each ￿rm n
takes into account the demand (A.11) for its product and sets its nominal price by maxi-
mizing the present discounted value of real pro￿ts. There are costs of nominal price adjust-
ment measured in terms of total pro￿ts foregone. The adjustment cost is denoted ￿PN;t
[pt(n);pt￿1(n)].8











(NA;￿ + NE;￿ + GN;￿)(1 ￿ ￿PN;￿(n))
(A.35)
where Dt;￿ (with Dt;t = 1) is the appropriate discount rate, to be de￿ned below in eq.
(A.55). As real variables are detrended and prices are de￿ ated by the CPI, eq. (A.35)
includes ￿t;￿, the CPI in￿ ation rate between time t and time ￿, and gt;￿, the rate of growth
of the global trend between t and ￿.
Noting that ￿rms n are symmetric and charge the same equilibrium price p(n) = pN,
the ￿rst order condition can be written as:




￿ EtDt;t+1￿t;t+1gt;t+1 [pt+1(n) ￿ mct+1(n)]
NA;t+1 + NE;t+1 + GN;t+1





Interpreting the previous equation, when prices are fully ￿ exible (￿PN = 0), the optimization





where the gross markup is a negative function of the elasticity of input substitution. De-
viations from markup pricing occur if ￿rms are penalized for modifying their prices in the
short term. The speed of adjustment in response to shocks depends on the trade-o⁄between
current and future expected costs, making the price-setting process forward-looking.













The adjustment cost is related to changes of the nominal price of nontradable n relative
to the contemporaneous in￿ ation target for the CPI, indexed by ￿t￿4;t. Underlying this
speci￿cation is the notion that ￿rms should not be penalized when their price hikes are
indexed to some (publicly observable) measures of aggregate or sectoral in￿ ation.9 The
8It is worth emphasizing that the adjustment costs are related to changes in nominal prices. How-
ever, the maximization problem can be carried out in terms of relative prices. In fact, denote with
GPN;t[Pt(n);Pt￿1(n)] the adjustment cost as a function of nominal (i.e. non de￿ated by the CPI)
prices Pt(n) and Pt￿1(n), with GPN;t[Pt(n);Pt￿1(n)] = ￿PN;t [pt(n);pt￿1(n)], and express the price-
setting problem in nominal terms. It is easy to verify that the ￿rst order condition of the new problem
coincides with (A.36) since Pt(n)@GPN;t=@Pt(n) = pt(n)@￿PN;t=@pt(n) and Pt(n)@GPN;t+1=@Pt(n) =
pt(n)@￿PN;t+1=@pt(n).
9More generally, the adjustment cost could be speci￿ed relative to any variable that converges asymp-
totically to the steady-state in￿ation rate.
viiin￿ ation target is speci￿ed in annualized terms (hence indexed by t￿4;t), while changes in
p(n) occur at a quarterly frequency.10
Price setting in the tradables sector and exchange rate pass-through
Consider now the price-setting problem in the tradables sector. As we re-introduce export
markets, once again our notation needs to make explicit the country indexes. In what follows
we use the index J for a generic country, and denote as H the country where the exporting
￿rm hH is located. We also introduce the distinction between import prices at the national
level and at the border level. National import prices such as pJ(hH) are paid by ￿rms in
country J for one unit of a good produced and exported by ￿rm hH located in country H.
These are the prices that enter equations such as (A.16) above. Border import prices are
indexed with a bar (e.g. pJ(hH)). These are the prices set by the exporting ￿rm hH. The
di⁄erence between the two prices stems from trade barriers such as tari⁄s.11 In terms of












t is a proportional tari⁄ duty imposed by country J over its imports from
country H.12
To the extent that the four country blocs represent segmented markets in the global
economy, each ￿rm hH in country H has to set four prices, one in the domestic market
and the other three in the export markets. Exports are invoiced (and prices are set) in the
currency of the destination market.
Accounting for (A.21), the four price-setting problems of ￿rm h in country H at time t















































When H 6= J, recall that pJ(hH) is the border price of good hH in country J, p
J;H
M is the





country J￿ s aggregate imports from country H. The term "H;J is the bilateral real exchange
rate between country H and country J (an increase in "H;J represents a real depreciation
of country H￿ s currency against country J)13
To determine the domestic prices of tradables pH(hH) we still use (A.40) with J = H,













PQ, as well as tarH;H = 0.
10This speci￿cation implies that the in￿ation target is known at any point in time.
11In a more general speci￿cation of the model the gap between the two prices re￿ects distribution costs
and retail margins. See for instance Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
12Our notation encompasses domestic sales of tradables, provided tarH;H = 0 so that pH(xH) = pH(xH).
13All exchange rates are quoted in real terms, that is, in relative consumption units. Of course, "H;J =
1="J;H and "H;H = 1.
viiiThe term ￿
H;J
PM(hH) denotes adjustment costs related to changes of the price of good hH




















Despite its fastidiousness, the notation above is straightforward and the equations are self-










































































If adjustment costs in the export market are relatively large, the prices of country H￿ s goods
in the foreign markets are characterized by signi￿cant stickiness in local currency. In this
case, the degree to which exchange rate movements (and other shocks to marginal costs in
country H) a⁄ect import prices in country J is rather small in the short run. If instead the
￿
J;H
PM coe¢ cients are zero worldwide, expression (A.42) collapses to a markup rule under the
law of one price, and exchange rate pass-through is full:
p
H;H


















As considered above, in each country there is a continuum of households indexed by j 2 [0;s],
the same index of labor inputs. Some households have access to capital markets, some do
not. The latter ￿nance their consumption by relying exclusively on their labor incomes. We
refer to the ￿rst type as ￿ Ricardian￿or ￿ forward-looking￿(FL). We refer to the second type
as ￿ non-Ricardian￿or ￿ liquidity-constrained￿(LC). The two types of households are also
heterogeneous in the labor market, as discussed above.







t;￿ u￿( C￿(j);‘￿(j) ) (A.44)
where the instantaneous felicity is a function of (detrended) consumption C and labor e⁄ort
‘:










(1 ￿ b‘)￿ ]1￿￿ (A.45)
In the expressions above ￿t;￿ is the discount rate between time t and time ￿, possibly
di⁄erent across countries. The term g
1￿￿
t;￿ in (A.44) implies that the disutility of labor e⁄ort
increases with the common trend.14 The parameter ￿ in (A.45), which a⁄ects the curvature
14The implicit assumption is that technological progress associated with home production activities is
related to the global trend. The restriction ￿t;￿g1￿￿
t;￿ < 1 is imposed to ensure that utility is bounded.
ixof consumption utility, is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The
parameter ￿, which a⁄ects the curvature of labor disutility, is the reciprocal of the Frisch
elasticity.
There is habit persistence in consumption with coe¢ cient 0 < bc < 1. The term Cj;t￿1 in
(A.45) is past per-capita consumption of household j￿ s peers, (i.e., either forward-looking or
liquidity-constrained agents). Similarly, there is habit persistence in leisure with coe¢ cient
0 < b‘ < 1. The terms ZU and ZV are positive parameters. Households￿preferences are
therefore symmetric within their respective categories but, because of di⁄erent reference
groups in habit formation, they are not symmetric across categories.
Budget constraint (Ricardian households)
The individual ￿ ow budget constraint for Ricardian agent j 2 [0;(1 ￿ sLC)s] is:
Bt(j) + "tB￿
t (j) ￿ (1 + it￿1)
Bt￿1(j)
￿t￿1;tgt￿1;t






+ (1 ￿ ￿K;t)rtKt(j) + (1 ￿ ￿L;t)wt(j)‘t(j)( 1 ￿ ￿W;t(j) )
￿ Ct(j) ￿ pE;tIt(j) + ￿t(j) ￿ TTt(j) (A.46)
Households hold two nominal bonds, denominated in domestic and US currency, respec-
tively.15 In terms of our notation, Bt(j) is holdings of the domestic bond by household j,
expressed in terms of domestic consumption units, B￿
t (j) is holdings of the international
bond, expressed in terms of US consumption units, and "t is the CPI-based real exchange
rate, expressed as the price of one US consumption basket in terms of domestic consump-
tion.16
The short-term nominal rates it and i￿
t are paid at the beginning of period t + 1 and
are known at time t. The two rates are directly controlled by their respective national
governments, so that i￿ = iUS. Only the US-currency bond is traded internationally: the
US bond is in zero net supply worldwide, while the domestic bond is issued by the local
government. It follows that the net ￿nancial wealth of each FL-type household j at time t
is:







A ￿nancial friction ￿B is introduced to guarantee that international net asset positions
follow a stationary process and the economies converge asymptotically to a well-de￿ned
steady state.17 Agents who take a position in the international bond market must deal
with ￿nancial intermediaries who charge a transaction fee ￿B on sales/purchases of the
international bond.18 This transaction cost is a function of the average net asset position of
15The choice of currency denomination of the international bond is arbitrary. With a simple re-de￿nition
of the relevant variables one could think of B￿ in terms of any available currency, or basket of currencies.
16It is understood that " is shorthand for "H;US, where H denotes the country under consideration.
17See Ghironi, • I‚ scan, and Rebucci (2005) for an analysis of the steady-state distribution of net foreign
assets with heterogeneous discounting.
18In our model it is assumed that all intermediation ￿rms are owned by the country￿ s residents, and that
their revenue is rebated to domestic households in a lump-sum fashion. A simple variant of the model
in which intermediation ￿rms are owned by foreign residents leaves the basic results virtually unchanged.
There are no intermediation costs for US residents entering the international bond market, that is, there is
no di⁄erence between onshore and o⁄shore US interest rates.
xthe whole economy. Speci￿cally, we adopt the following functional form:

























where 0 ￿ ￿B1 ￿ 1, ￿B2 > 0, and "tB￿ ￿ (1=s)"t
R s(1￿sLC)
0 B￿(j)dj represents the per-
capita net asset position of the country in consumption units. The term b￿
FDES is the
￿ desired￿net asset position of the country expressed as a ratio of GDP.19 This variable
measures the degree of international exposure that ￿nancial intermediaries consider appro-
priate for the economy, based on their assessment of the economic outlook. Both desired
(b￿
FDES) and actual ("B￿=GDP) net asset positions converge over the long term to their
steady-state value b￿
F;SS.
To understand the role played by ￿B, suppose ￿rst that b￿
FDES = ZB = 0 and ￿
US = ￿.
In this case, when the net asset position of the country is equal to its ￿ desired￿level of
zero, it must be the case that ￿B = 0 and the return on the international bond is equal
to 1 + i￿. If the country is a net creditor worldwide ￿B rises above zero, implying that
the country￿ s households lose an increasing fraction of their international bond returns to
￿nancial intermediaries. When holdings of the international bond go to in￿nity, the return
on the international bond approaches (1 + i￿)(1 ￿ ￿B1). By the same token, if the country
is a net debtor worldwide ￿B falls from zero to ￿￿B1, implying that households pay an
increasing intermediation premium on their international debt. When net borrowing goes to
in￿nity, the cost of borrowing approaches (1 + i￿)(1 + ￿B1). The parameter ￿B2 controls
the ￿ atness of the ￿B function: if ￿B2 = 0 then ￿B = 0 regardless of the net asset position; if
￿B2 tends to in￿nity then 1￿￿B = (1 ￿ ￿B1) for any arbitrarily small net lending position,
and 1 ￿ ￿B = (1 + ￿B1) for any arbitrarily small net borrowing position.
Consider now the other components of (A.48). The term b￿
FDES can be positive or
negative. The above considerations are still valid after reinterpreting the concepts of ￿ net
creditor￿or ￿ net borrower￿in terms of deviations from the desired levels. The variable ZB;t
can be a stochastic process with zero mean in steady state:20 in our framework, uncertainty
in international ￿nancial intermediation plays the same role that ￿ uncovered interest parity
shocks￿or risk-premium ￿ uctuations play in other open-economy models. Finally, when rates
of time preference diverge across countries and ￿
￿ 6= ￿, the transaction cost is appropriately
modi￿ed to account for asymmetries in real interest rates across countries. An appropriate
parameterization allows the model to generate realistic dynamics for net asset positions and
current account.





















According to the previous expression, b￿H
FDES is a country-speci￿c constant, b￿H
FNEUT, ad-
justed to account for changes in the debt-to-GDP ratios in either the domestic economy
(BH=GDPH) or the rest of the world (BJ=GDPJ).
This speci￿cation provides a plausible link between debt imbalances and net asset posi-
tions. When the national debt-to-GDP ratio increases, domestic agents reduce the share of
19The concept of GDP in our model is discussed below with reference to (A.90).
20Fluctuations in ZB cannot be large enough to push ￿B above 1.
xiforeign securities in their portfolios by selling the international bond to foreigners. By the
same token, if the debt-to-GDP ratio increased in the US, investors in the rest of the world
would require a higher return on US securities, leading to a higher share of US assets in their
portfolios or a reduction of net borrowing from the US. Of course, our approach should be
viewed only as a crude approximation to the actual determinants of cross-country spreads
and interest rate premia in response to macroeconomic imbalances, whose endogenization
should be eventually incorporated in a self-contained model. It remains unclear, however,
whether a framework that incorporates a large amount of complications from which we ab-
stract here would add much to our qualitative conclusions. Quantitatively, one could take
b￿
FDES as a free variable and estimate the ￿F1 and ￿F2 parameters on the basis of empirical
evidence on the link between net asset positions and debt levels. Alternatively, one could
rely on cross-fertilization with respect to alternative theoretical models able to shed light
on the structural determinants of these parameters.
Households accumulate physical capital which they rent to domestic ￿rms at the after-tax
rate r(1 ￿ ￿K). The law of motion of capital is:
Kt+1(j)gt;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt(j) + ￿I;tKt(j) 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 (A.50)
where ￿ is the country-speci￿c depreciation rate of capital. To simulate realistic investment
￿ ows, capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs. Capital accumulation is denoted
￿I;tKt(j), where ￿I(:) is an increasing, concave, and twice-continuously di⁄erentiable func-
tion of the investment/capital ratio It(j)=Kt(j) with two properties entailing no adjustment
costs in steady state: ￿I(￿+g￿1) = ￿+g￿1 and ￿0
I(￿+g￿1) = 1. The speci￿c functional























where ￿I1, ￿I2 ￿ 0, and g is the steady-state growth rate.
Each forward-looking household is the monopolistic supplier of a speci￿c labor input
and sets the nominal wage for its labor variety j accounting for (A.33). Labor incomes are
taxed at the rate ￿L. There is sluggish wage adjustment due to resource costs that are
measured in terms of the total wage bill. The adjustment cost is denoted ￿WFL;t (for Wage












Ricardian households own all domestic ￿rms and there is no international trade in claims
on ￿rms￿pro￿ts. The variable ￿ includes all dividends accruing to shareholders, plus all
revenue from nominal and real adjustment rebated in a lump-sum way to all Ricardian
households, plus revenue from ￿nancial intermediation which is assumed to be provided by
domestic ￿rms exclusively.
Finally, agents pay lump-sum (non-distortionary) net taxes TTt(j) denominated in con-
sumption units.
Consumer optimization (Ricardian households)
The representative Ricardian household chooses bond holdings, capital and consumption
paths, and sets wages to maximize its expected lifetime utility (A.44) subject to (A.46) and
(A.50), taking into account (A.33).
xiiFor expositional convenience, it is worthwhile to write explicitly the maximization prob-






























+ (1 ￿ ￿L;￿)w￿(j)1￿ FL;￿w
 FL;￿
FL;￿ (wFL;￿=w￿)
￿ L;￿ ‘FL;￿(1 ￿ ￿W;￿[w￿(j);w￿￿1(j)])
+ (1 ￿ ￿K;￿)r￿K￿(j) ￿ C￿(j) ￿ pE;￿I￿(j) + ￿￿(j) ￿ TT￿(j) )
+ ￿￿(j) ( ￿K￿+1(j)g￿;￿+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)K￿(j) + ￿I;￿ [I￿(j)=K￿(j)]K￿(j) ) g (A.53)
where ￿ and ￿ are the multipliers associated with, respectively, the budget constraint and
the capital accumulation process.
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to Ct(j) and It(j) yield:
￿t(j) = @ut(j)=@Ct(j) = ￿t(j)￿0
I;t(j)=pE;t (A.54)
In a symmetric setup, @ut(j)=@Ct(j) is the same across Ricardian agents j. Their stochastic











Accounting for the above expressions, the ￿rst order conditions with respect to Bt(j) and
B￿
t (j) are, respectively:
1 = (1 + it)EtDt;t+1 (A.56)
1 = (1 + i￿
t)(1 ￿ ￿B;t)Et (Dt;t+1￿t;t+1) (A.57)








In a non-stochastic steady state (A.56) implies (1 + iSS)=￿SS = g￿
SS=￿SS, where ￿SS is the
(gross steady-state quarterly) in￿ ation rate, (1 + iSS)=￿SS is the real interest rate, gSS is
the (gross steady-state quarterly) rate of growth of the world economy, 1=￿SS is the rate
of time preference, and g￿
SS=￿SS is the ￿ natural￿rate of the economy.21 Expressions (A.56)
and (A.57) yield the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity, recalling that the return on
international bond holdings is modi￿ed to account for the costs of intermediation ￿B. In
a non-stochastic steady state the interest di⁄erential (1 + iSS)=[(1 + i￿
SS)(1 ￿ ￿B;SS)] is
equal to the steady-state nominal depreciation rate of the currency vis-a-vis the US, and
relative purchasing power parity holds.













] ) g (A.59)
21International di⁄erences in natural rates can arise from asymmetric rates of time preference. They are
accounted for in the de￿nition of ￿B in (A.48)
xiiiExpression (A.59) links capital accumulation to the behavior of the after-tax price of capital
(1 ￿ ￿K)r. In a non-stochastic steady state 1 + (1 ￿ ￿K;SS)rSS=pE;SS is equal to the sum
of the natural real rate g￿
SS=￿SS and the rate of capital depreciation ￿.22
Finally, taking the ￿rst order condition with respect to w(j) and noting that w(j) = wFL
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￿

















The interpretation of (A.60) is similar to (A.42) above. In a non-stochastic steady state
the real wage wFL is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, ￿u‘=uc, augmented by the markup  =(  ￿ 1) which re￿ ects monopoly power in the
labor market.
Consumer optimization (liquidity-constrained households)
As liquidity-constrained households have no access to capital markets, their optimal choices
are con￿ned to labor supply. Similar to Ricardian households, they can optimally set their
wages to exploit their market power. The maximization problem of agent j 2 ((1 ￿ sLC)s;s]








￿ L;t ‘LC;t ) + ￿t(j) ( ￿Ct(j) ￿ TTt(j)
+ (1 ￿ ￿L;t)wt(j)1￿ LC;tw
 LC;t
LC;t (wLC;t=wt)
￿ L;t ‘LC;t(1 ￿ ￿WLC;t[wt(j);wt￿1(j)]) )
(A.61)
It is assumed that redistributive policies TT rebate to LC-type households the income losses
associated with wage adjustment, so that their consumption level is:
Ct(j) = (1 ￿ ￿L;t)wt(j)‘t(j) (A.62)







= (1 ￿ ￿L;t) [
￿
 LC;t ￿ 1
￿





Denoting wFL the wage rate w(j) that solves (A.60), and wLC the wage rate w(j) that





LC;t + (1 ￿ sLC)w
1￿ L;t
FL;t (A.64)
22The expectation operator on the left hand side of (A.59) is needed as shocks to the trend gt;t+1 are
not part of the information set at time t. This is because variables are expressed as deviations from the
current trend. An alternative speci￿cation which expresses variables as deviations from the lagged trend
would make little di⁄erence.
xivGovernment
Public spending falls on nontradable goods, both ￿nal and intermediate. In per-capita terms,
GC is government consumption, GI is government investment, and GN denotes public pur-
chases of intermediate nontradables. There are four sources of (net) tax revenue: taxes on
capital income ￿K, taxes on labor income ￿L, import tari⁄s tar, and lump-sum taxes net of
transfers to households TT. The government ￿nances the excess of public expenditure over
net taxes by issuing debt denominated in nominal currency, denoted B in per-capita terms.
All national debt is held exclusively by domestic (Ricardian) agents. The budget constraint
of the government is:
Bt ￿ (1 + it￿1)
Bt￿1
￿t￿1;tgt￿1;t
+ Gt ￿ GREV;t (A.65)
where:
Gt ￿ GC;t + pE;tGI;t + pN;tGN;t (A.66)
















































De￿ne now the average tax rate for the economy ￿ as:
￿t ￿ GREV;t=GDPt (A.68)



























The previous equations de￿ne the relations between debt-to-GDP, average tax rate, and
de￿cit-to-GDP ratio which are sustainable in the long term. In what follows we treat the
long-run debt-to-GDP ratio as a policy parameter set by the government, and let ￿SS and
DEFSS=GDPSS be determined by (A.70).
The government is assumed to control lump-sum taxes, trade policy parameters, ￿ and
￿K directly, while ￿L is endogenously determined. The ￿scal rule for ￿ is speci￿ed as:
￿t = (￿t￿1 + ￿t + Et￿t+1)=3 + ￿￿1(
Bt
GDPt





















where bTAR is the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio, converging to BSS=GDPSS. The tax rate is
a smoothed function of past and expected future rates, adjusted upward when the current
debt-to-GDP ratio is above the average of its current target and its past observed level,
xvwhen the current de￿cit-to-GDP ratio is above its sustainable steady-state level, and when
current government spending as a share of GDP is above its long-run level.
The government controls the short-term rate it. Monetary policy is speci￿ed in terms of
annualized interest rate rules of the form:
(1 + it)
4 = !i (1 + it￿1)





+ !1Et (￿t￿1;t+3 ￿ ￿t￿1;t+3) (A.72)
The current interest rate it is an average of the lagged rate it￿1 and the current ￿ neutral￿
rate ineut








This average is adjusted to account for the expected in￿ ation gap three quarters in the
future.24 The rule (A.72) could be modi￿ed to include policy responses to a set of other
variables (such as exchange rate or current account ) expressed as deviations from their
targets. In a steady state when all constant targets are reached it must be the case that:












The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraints and market clearing
conditions, adopting explicit country indexes.












































































23Recall that ￿t￿￿;t￿￿+4 is the year-on-year gross CPI in￿ation target prevailing at time t for the four-
quarter period between t ￿ ￿ and t ￿ ￿ + 4.
24In the case of AS, we model an exchange rate targeting regime by introducing the component !AS
2 ￿AS
t
in (A.72), where ￿AS is de￿ned in (A.58) and we choose a very high value of !AS
2 to peg the nominal
bilateral exchange rate against the US.
xviThe ￿nal good A can be used for private (by both liquidity-constrained and forward-










t (jH)djH + sHGH
C;t (A.79)












t (jH)djH + sHGH
I;t (A.80)






































































































































































t (jH)djH = sHBH
t (A.82)









t (jJ)djJ = 0: (A.83)
for the international bond market. Finally, aggregating the budget constraints across private
and public agents after imposing the appropriate transversality conditions we obtain the law






































































and the variable IMPADJ is the sum of the last two terms in (A.81).
Measuring output and trade balance























The left hand side of (A.86) is country H￿ s current account, the ￿rst term on the right hand
side are net factor payments from the rest of the world to country H and TBAL is the trade

































































Note that there is a discrepancy between GDP measured according to national accounting
standards (goods output), and GDP measured as manufacturing output. This discrepancy
re￿ ects the portion of the revenue from sales of goods that is not earned by producers, such
as costs incurred with imports adjustment and wedges between border and market prices of
imported goods.25
While theoretically sound, this measure of output would bear little similarity with stan-
dard ￿xed-weight, constant-dollar measures of real GDP provided by national accounts. The
problem is particularly severe for relatively open economies facing large swings in real ex-
change rates and relative prices. In our simulations, we therefore adopt ￿ national accounts￿
concepts for GDP, TBAL and their components, evaluating constant-dollar expenditures
at any time t by using ￿xed steady-state prices instead of the corresponding relative prices
at time t.
25For a statistical assessment of the relationship between the two concepts, see Steindel (2004).
xviii